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CORPORATIONS DON'T KILL PEOPLE - PEOPLE DO:
EXPLORING THE GOALS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
CORPORATE HOMICIDE BILL
A corporation is an abstraction. It is incapable itself of
doing any physical act or being in any state of mind.
-Lord Diplock'
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation is a creature of law, acting as a fictional entity in the
eyes of the law. 2 However, a corporation is made up of and run by
people, acting as agents of the corporation. 3 These peoples' actions
can be criminal in nature and result in death. Consequently, criminal
prosecutors seek to punish someone or something for homicide.
The capsized Zeebrugge ferry, the King's Cross fire, the Clapham
and Paddington Rail crashes, the "Bowtelle"-"Marchioness" boat colli-
sion, and the Hillsborough football tragedy all represent recent disas-
ters in which the United Kingdom's Director of Public Prosecutions
either decided not to prosecute or failed to successfully prosecute the
corporations or organizations responsible for many deaths.4 These re-
cent events5 inspired the United Kingdom to propose the Corporate
1. R. v. P & 0 European Ferries, Ltd., 93 Cr. App. R. 72, 82 (1990) (quoting Lord
Diplock's speech). The court further quoted from Diplock's speech:
Yet in law it is a person capable of exercising legal rights and of being sub-
ject to legal liabilities which may involve ascribing to it not only physical acts
which are in reality done by a natural person on its behalf but also the
mental state in which that person did them.
2. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
100 (8h ed. 2000).
3. Stanley S. Arkin, Corporate Guilty Plea, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 1.
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. See generally Jean Eaglesham, Making an Offense Out of a Disaster: Plans to Make
Directors Criminally Liable for Deaths Caused by Negligence Could Have Far Reaching Effects,
FIN. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2001, at 13; Ben Webster, Paddington Crash Families to Fight for Prose-
cution, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at 12; Andrew Edgar, Corporate Manslaughter is Just
Around the Corner, 12 INT'L Co. & COMM'L L. REV. 117 (2001); Michael Jefferson, Recent
Developments in Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 16 Co. LAWYER 146 (1995); Richard J.
McGrane & Ian M. Gault, Corporate Manslaughter in Major Disasters, 2 INT'L Co. &
COMM'L L. REV. 166 (1991); Corporate Manslaughter: Back on the Cards, 22 Co. LAWYER 1
(2001).
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Homicide Bill; a statute that, if passed, would make the corporate en-
tity criminally liable for deaths that occur as a result of "management
failure." 6 This Note argues that the Corporate Homicide Bill will not
deter corporate actions that result in death.
Section 1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to the corporate
entity and allows a court to issue a fine as punishment. 7 A better way to
deter homicide is to convict and imprison corporate functionaries in a
personal capacity. Section 2 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to
corporate officers in a personal capacity;8 however, §5 of the Bill de-
6. Corporate Homicide Act, 2000, at §1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Corporate Homicide
Act].
7. Id. Section 1, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Corporate Killing
1. (1) A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if-
(a) a management failure is the cause or one of the causes of a
persons death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can rea-
sonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above-
(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in
which its activities are managed or organi[z]ed fails to ensure
the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by
those activities; and
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omis-
sion of an individual.
(3) A corporation guilty of an offense under this section is liable on
conviction on indictment for a fine.
8. Id. at §2. Section 2, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Corporate Killing
1. (1) An officer of a corporation is guilty of corporate killing if-
(a) a management failure is the cause or one of the causes of a
persons death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can rea-
sonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above-
(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in
which its activities are managed or organized fails to ensure the
health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those
activities; and
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omis-
sion of an individual.
(3) A corporation guilty of an offense under this section is liable on
conviction on indictment to a fine or imprisonment or both.
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fines "officer" narrowly,9 excluding from liability other corporate func-
tionaries who may be associated with the homicide. The House of
Commons should reform the Corporate Homicide Bill to exclude §1
and expand the definition of "officer" in §5 to include corporate func-
tionaries associated with the homicide.
Part II of this note outlines various justifications and aspirations of
criminal justice and punishment, discusses agency and the corporate
form, and explores the history of corporate criminal liability in the
United Kingdom. Part III uses recent events to illustrate that corpo-
rate fining is replacing individual imprisonment for corporate-related
homicide in the United Kingdom, and demonstrates that the Corpo-
rate Homicide Bill will not effectively deter corporate-related homi-
cide. Part IV argues that courts should imprison corporate
functionaries associated with the homicide rather than fine the corpo-
rate entity for homicide. It also advocates reformation of the Corpo-
rate Homicide Bill to exclude corporate liability and expand the scope
of personal liability. This note concludes in Part V that personal im-
prisonment of corporate functionaries associated with the homicide
can deter homicide more effectively than corporate fines.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Aspirations and Justifications of Criminal Justice and Punishment
All crimes, with the exception of strict liability crimes, require an
act or omission (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). lo
Society and the criminal justice system seek to punish the culpable
mental states and acts underlying crimes.'1
Throughout history, society has justified punishment in many dif-
ferent ways. 12 Although modern society views the gruesome methods
of punishment previously employed, in medieval times for example, as
"cruel and unusual,"' 3 the concept of "an eye for an eye" has long en.
9. Id. at §5. Section 5 defines "officer" as "the chairman, maniaging director
chief executive or secretary of a corporation."
10. Rebecca Dresser, Culpd)ility and Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY
41, 85 (1993).
11. GEORGE Dix & M. MIGcIAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
ed. 1996).
12. See generally Catherine Scharf, The Philosophy of Punishment: Does Punishmer
ter Crime and Keep Society Safe? (Winter 2000), available at http://www.publicrelaf
villanova. edu/magazine/Summer%202000/Punishment-htm.
13. Id. at para. 3.
20031
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dured in the criminal justice system 14 and closely resembles what is
known as retribution. 15
Advocates of retribution argue that society should intentionally in-
flict pain and suffering on a criminal to the extent he deserves because
he willingly committed a crime. 16 However, not all legal philosophers
agree with such means and justification for punishment.17 Critics of
retribution view punishment as something more than mere vengeance
toward the criminal in response to his misconduct.1 8
Another justification for punishment is rehabilitation. 19 Rehabili-
tation aims to alter a criminal offender's behavior so that he or she no
longer violates laws.2" Thus, rehabilitation serves a utilitarian end;21 it
seeks to do the greatest good for the greatest number by reforming a
criminal, thereby reducing the number of criminals in society.
2 2
Those who oppose rehabilitation characterize it as impossible or
immoral.23
A third justification for punishment, deterrence, also serves a utili-
tarian end;2 4 it helps cure the sociological problem of criminal behav-
ior, but it does not seek to punish by hurting or rehabilitating an
individual. 2 5 Instead, deterrence aims to dissuade the offender and
other possible offenders from committing future crimes.26 Deterrence
can be split into two categories: specific and general. Specific deter-
rence is the pressure that memories of incarceration place on a re-
leased convict, causing him or her to obey the law.2 7 General
deterrence is the pressure that a convict's pain and suffering exerts on
potential criminals, causing them to obey the law. 28
14. Id. at para. 5.
15. Id.
16. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punish-
mentJustified, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1150 (1990).
17. See id.; JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 82-3 (1975).
18. GIBBS, supra note 17.
19. See id.; see also Blecker, supra note 16; Scharf, supra note 12.
20. GIBBS, supra note 17, at 72.
21. Scharf, supra note 12, at para. 6.
22. Id.
23. Blecker, supra note 16.
24. Scharf, supra note 12.
25. Id.
26. See id.; see also Blecker, supra note 16; GIBBS, supra note 17.
27. Blecker, supra note 16.
28. id.
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Most theories of corporate punishment primarily rely on deter-
rence as ajustification. 29 The United Kingdom's Corporate Homicide
Bill embodies such a theory, aiming to deter management failure that
results in death.3 0
B. Agency and the Corporate Form
The corporate form dates back as far as the thirteenth century.-"
The earliest corporations were ecclesiastical entities that managed
church property.3 2 Later, municipalities and governmental bodies be-
gan to take advantage of the corporate form, 33 and the government
incorporated organizations such as hospitals and universities. 34 The
government incorporated early trades based on whether they provided
the community with basic necessities. 35 Henry II chartered the earliest
trade organizations, the weavers.3 6 During the 1 4 th and 1 5 th Centuries,
the goldsmiths, mercers, haberdashers, fishmongers, vintners, and
merchant tailors were incorporated.3
7
To form a corporation today, one must file formal statements with
a governmental body announcing his or her intention to incorpo-
rate.3' 8 The corporation then achieves entity status: The newly formed
corporation has become a legally separate being through the opera-
tion of the law.39 The corporation exists separately from its incorpora-
tor(s) existence;40 it is, so to speak, a fictional person.4 1 It can exercise
29. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND ACCOUNTrA-
BILITY (1993).
30. See generally Corporate Homicide Act 2000; Celia Wells, The Law Commission
Report on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Para-
dox, and Peninsularity, CRIM. L. REv. 545 (Aug. 1996); Bob Sullivan, Corporate Killing -
Some Government Proposals, CRIM. L. REV. 31-39 (Jan. 2001).
31. Arkin, supra note 3.
32. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, ET.AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS ( 5 th ed. 2001).
33. Id.
34. W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16' and 1 7 h Centuries, 31 YALE
L.J. 382, 382 (1922).
35. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV.
L. REv. 105, 108-09 (1888).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. EISENBURG, supra note 2, at 107.
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rights and have power in its own name; it can sue and be sued; it can
hold property; and it must pay taxes. 4 2 Can it commit a crime?
Because corporations are separate legal entities run entirely by
people, they are governed largely by the principles of agency law. 4 3 An
agent is someone who acts on behalf of a principal44 - the corporation.
A principal controls an agent.45
When the corporation causes harm, problems arise as to whether
liability should rest with the corporation as a whole or with its agents. 46
Corporations are organized to limit managers', directors', and officers'
liability, rendering only the corporation as a whole liable for any harm
it causes. 47 This is especially problematic when the harm can be char-
acterized as criminal, because criminal law is primarily focused on a
person's action and mental state, not those of a corporate entity.48
Therefore, punishing a corporation undermines the theoretical foun-
dations of criminal law, which presuppose that crimes involve an act
and a culpable mental state. 4 9 Furthermore, crime is necessarily an
ultra vires50 act of a corporation; liability cannot be imputed to it be-
cause one cannot legally form a corporation for purposes of commit-
ting crime. 5 1
C. The History of Corporate Criminal Liability in England
Legal scholars historically advanced the position that a corpora-
tion could not be punished. 52 In 1250, Pope Innocent IV stated that a
corporation could not be excommunicated because it did not have a
soul. 53 Later, Edward, first Baron Turlow, expanded upon Innocent's
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 100.
47. Id.
48. L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 3-4
(1969).
49. See Dresser, supra note 10.
50. Ultra vires is defined as being in excess of the powers of a corporation. STEVEN
H. GIFIs, DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS: A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 514
(3d. ed. 1998).
51. LEIGH, supra note 48, at 3.
52. Arkin, supra note 3, at 28.
53. Id.
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position in his highly quoted statement that a corporation has "no soul
to be damned and no body to be kicked." 54
Early English courts did not recognize corporate criminal liabil-
ity.55 In 1612, the King's Bench stated corporations could not commit
crimes. 56 In 1701, Chief Justice Holt held that "a corporation is not
indictable, but the particular members of it are."57
However, courts later began to hold corporations liable for certain
crimes. 58 In 1842, a corporation did not obey a court order to build a
bridge, and the Queens Bench held the it liable 5 9 for nonfeasance, 60
which equates to what is now known as criminal contempt of court. In
1846, a corporation created a nuisance by building a bridge that inter-
fered with a highway, and the Queen's Bench held the corporation
criminally liable 6' for malfeasance. 6 2
Industries and corporations became widespread forms of business
during the late 1800s, and corporate criminal law evolved to accommo-
date theories of corporate liability. 63 In 1866, the Queen's Bench held
a quarry company liable for criminal nuisance when employees threw
stone into a river that hindered navigation. 64 The court adopted a vi-
carious liability theory from tort law65 to find corporations criminally
liable for employee misconduct within the scope of employment. 6 6
54. Id.
55. See Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701); In Re Sutton's Hospital, 77
Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1612).
56. Id. at 973. This was a civil case concerning whether a hospital had entity status
as a corporation. However, the court outlined, in dicta, certain actions that a corpora-
tion could and could not theoretically perform.
57. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1518. This quote represents Holt's opinion in its
entirety.
58. See Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 3 Q.B. 223 (1842); Queen v. Great
N. of Eng. Ry., 9 Q.B. 315 (1846).
59. Nonfeasance is defined as the omission to perform a required duty. GIFTS,
supra note 50, at 322.
60. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 3 Q.B. at 233.
61. Great N. of Eng. Ry., 9 Q.B. at 326.
62. Malfeasance is defined as a wrongful act, which the actor has no legal right to
do. GIFIS, supra note 50, at 287.
63. Arkin, supra note 3, at 28.
64. See Queen v. Stephens, 1 L.R. 702 (Q.B. 1866).
65. Id.
66. GIFIs, supra note 50, at 527.
2003]
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Vicarious liability became a dominant theory in prosecuting cor-
porations throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. 67 Most cases in-
volved minor statutory offenses, which Parliament intended to be strict
liability offenses; the master (corporation) was strictly liable for the ser-
vant's (employee's) criminal conduct. 68 However, corporations still
could not possess the intent required for crimes involving death or
personal violence;69 at that time, corporations had only been con-
victed of crimes involving negligence or strict liability.
The "directing mind" theory, which developed throughout the
1900s, provided a way for prosecutors to indict and convict corpora-
tions for crimes outside the scope of negligence and strict liability.70
Lord Denning, in 1956, outlined the directing mind theory, which sug-
gested that the guilty mind of directors or managers could make a
company guilty of crimes requiring a guilty mind or culpable mens
rea.7 1 Denning, explaining the rationale of the theory, stated:
A company may in many ways be likened to a human
body. They have a brain and a nerve [center] which con-
trols what they do. They also have hands which hold the
tools and act in accordance with directions from the
[center]. Some of the people in the company are mere
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or
will. Others are directors and managers who represent
the directing mind and will of the company, and control
what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as
such.... Whether their intention is the companies inten-
tion depends on the nature of the matter under consider-
ation, the relative position of the officer or agent and the
other relevant facts and circumstances of the case. 7 2
In 1971, the House of Lords acknowledged Lord Denning's ratio-
nale in an appeal from the English Court of Appeals, stating that case-
67. See Queen v. Stevens, 1 L.R. 702; Mousell Bros. v. London and N.W. Rail. Co.,
1916-1917 All E.R. 1101 (K.B. 1917); D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd., 1 All
E.R. 119 (KB. 1944); R. v. I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 691 (Crim. App. 1944).
68. R.J. Wickens & C.A. Ong, Confusion Worse Confounded: The End of the Directing
Mind Theory, J. Bus. L. at 532 (Nov. 1997).
69. See R. v. Cory Bros. & Co., 1 KB. 810 (1927).
70. See generally Wickens & Ong, supra note 68.
71. H.L. Bolton Co. v. TJ. Graham & Sons, 3 All E.R. 624, 630 (C.A. 1956).
72. Id.
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law showed companies can be convicted of intent-based crimes: Never-
theless, the court held that a shop assistant was not a directing mind of
a company that owned many supermarkets. 73  Thus, the directing
mind theory seems to represent a middle-ground between strict liabil-
ity and no liability.7 4
Corporations have since been convicted of such crimes as conspir-
acy to defraud, 75 aiding and abetting regulatory offenses, 76 contempt
of court,77 and, for the first time in 1994, manslaughter. 78
III. TRENDS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE
CORPORATE HOMICIDE BILL
Recent events have spawned public interest in creating a new the-
ory to hold corporations liable for crimes. 79 In 1987, the Herald of
Free Enterprise, a ferry with more than 500 people aboard, departed
the Belgian port of Zeebrugge for England with its bow doors open. 80
It subsequently took on water and capsized killing 188 people.8 ' The
United Kingdom's Director of Public Prosecutions initiated involun-
tary manslaughter charges against the company P & 0 European En-
terprises and some of its agents, including the assistant bosun who fell
asleep and neglected his duty to close the bow doors.8 "2 Justice Turner
73. Tesco Supermarkets v. Natrass, 2 All. E.R. 127 (H.L. 1971). Tesco was con-
victed of a breach of the Trade Descriptions Act for displaying misleading prices and
appealed to the House of Lords, who reversed the conviction.
74. Id. For a detailed account of the Tesco case and cases decided in that time
period relating to the directing mind theory, see Wickens & Ong, supra note 68, at 525-
545.
75. See I.C.R. Haulage, 1 All E.R. 691 (Crim. App. 1944).
76. See Accrete's Air Travel Ltd. v. D.P.P., 1 All E.R. 933 (1950); John Henshall
Quarries Ltd. v. Harvey, 2 Q.B. 233 (1965).
77. See R. v. Odham's Press 3 W.L.R. 796 (1956).
78. Gary Slapper, PLC, Wat Is Your Plea?, TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994 (reporting on R. v.
O.L.L. Ltd., an unreported case decided in the Crown Court five days earlier). Four
school friends were killed when their canoes capsized in Lyme Bay on a trip the defen-
dants organized. The defendants were aware that they employed inadequate safety pre-
cautions; the managing director failed to warn the harbor authorities, did not employ
competent instructors, and did not use flares or look-outs. His wrongs were imputed to
the company through the directing mind theory. However, the company was small, and
the managing director was a major stockholder who basically controlled the corpora-
tion by himself. See LEIGH, supra note 48, at 43-73 (comprehensive discussion of the
other cases in which, and other crimes for which, corporations have been held liable).
79. See LEIGH, supra note 48.
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held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendants
should have perceived the risks of open-door sailing.83 He stated that
P & 0 should be acquitted because most of its agents could not be
convicted. 84
In 1988, 35 people died when three rush hour trains collided after
a signaling breakdown.8 5 The Director of Public Prosecutions decided
not to bring manslaughter charges against British Rail or its techni-
cians due to insufficient evidence.8 6 In 1989, 95 football fans died due
to possible mishandling of the crowd by Yorkshire Police; however, the
Director of Public Prosecutions again decided to forego bringing crim-
inal charges.8 7 More recently, the Crown Prosecution Service, after an-
other train crash, stated it would not prosecute Railtrack or its
managers for the Paddington crash in 1999, despite the company's his-
tory of corporate failings.88
Prior to the Paddington crash, Lord Hoffman indicated that a
more flexible approach was necessary to successfully convict the corpo-
rate entity, because the directing mind theory was apparently not use-
ful for manslaughter cases. 89 Following Hoffman's suggestion, in 1996
the Law Commission proposed a new theory designed to create corpo-
rate criminal liability for management failure that results in harm.90
Unlike the vicarious or directing mind theories, the management
failure theory looks to corporate systems, practices, and policies, rather
than individual actions.9 1 Management failure occurs when corporate
conduct falls far below what is reasonably expected of the corporation
in the circumstances, 92 and when the way in which its activities are
managed or organized fails to ensure the health and safety of persons
employed in or affected by those activities.9 3 The management failure
theory has not changed since its inception in 1996;9 4 the Blair adminis-
83. See generally P & 0 European Fenies, 93 Cr. Ap. R. 72.
84. Id. at 88.
85. See McCrane & Gault, supra note 5, at 170.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 170-71.
88. See Webster, supra note 5.
89. Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, 3 All
E.R. 918 (P.C. 1995).
90. Wells, supra note 30.
91. Id. at 548.
92. Corporate Homicide Act, supra note 6, at §§1(1)(b), 2(1)(b).
93. Id. at §§1(2)(a), 2(2)(a).
94. Compare Wells, supra note 30, at 549, with Corporate Homicide Act, supra note
(Vol. 22
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tration presented the management failure theory to the House of
Commons as the Corporate Homicide Bill in April 2000.9 5
Although §1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to the corpo-
rate entity and permits courts to issue fines, 96 the Health and Safety at
Work Act of 1974 ("HSWA") already has punishment mechanisms in
place to fine the corporate entity for violating the HSWA.9 7 Further,
the Corporate Homicide Bill would preempt prosecution under the
HSWA, rendering its appropriate provisions meaningless. 98
Corporate fines do not work to successfully deter corporate-re-
lated harm. First, since the enactment of the HSWA there has been a
substantial number of deaths related to corporate management fail-
ure. 99 The fines provided for in the HSWA have not deterred corpo-
rate-related harms; in fact, corporate-related deaths have grown in
number since corporate fining was codified.1 00
95. See generally Corporate Homicide Act.
96. Id. at §1.
97. When Great Western Trains pled guilty to violating HSWA §3(1) for the
Southhall train crash, it received a £1,500,000 fine. Attorney-General's Reference (No.
2 of 1999), 2000 Q.B. 796 (Eng. C.A.); Case Comment, Causing Polluting Matter to Enter
Controlled Waters - Offence of Strict Liability, JOURNAL OF PLANNING & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
U.P.L.] 943, 953 (Sept. 2000).
98. Corporate Homicide Act, supra note 6, at §§ 3(7),(8)(a). Section 3, in rele-
vant part, reads as follows:
Remedial Orders Against Convicted Corporation or Officer
3. (1) A court before which a corporation or officer is convicted of corpo-
rate killing may, subject to subsection (2) below, order the corpo-
ration or officer to take such steps, within such time, as the order
specifies for remedying the failure in question and any matter
which appears to the court to have resulted from the failure and
been the cause or one of the causes of the death.
(7) Where an order is made against a corporation under this section it
shall not be liable under any of the provisions mentioned in subsec-
tion (8) below by reason of anything which the order requires it to
remedy in so far as it continues during the time specified by the
order or any further time allowed under subsection (4) above.
(8) The provisions referred to in subsection (7) are-
(b) the provisions of Part I of the Health and Safety at Work etc.
Act 1974...
99. See Eaglesham, supra note 5.
100. See generally Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29.
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Second, corporations have built-in mechanisms that allow them to
treat fines, in reasonable amounts, as a cost of doing business. 10 1 A
corporation may simply withhold shareholder dividend payments and
use the money it would have distributed to pay its fines. 10 2 Further-
more, the Corporate Homicide Bill states that a court may issue addi-
tional fines if a corporation is a repeat offender who does not comply
with a court order to remedy the management failure. 10 3 Excessive
fining, however, merely redirects pain and suffering back onto the
public. Large fines, while likely to trigger internal disciplinary mea-
sures within the corporation, are also likely to reduce corporate sol-
vency, lead to layoffs, plant closings, or bankruptcy, and injure
stockholders or creditors. 10 4 Such adverse consequences can often be
more harmful than the corporate crime itself, particularly when the
consequences affect a narrow class of people and the injury the corpo-
ration caused is widely diffused. 10 5
Third, stigmatizing a corporate entity is likely to further harm the
community in which the corporation operates.1 0 6 A criminal reputa-
tion will reduce a corporation's popularity within its community.1
0 7
Thus, any benefit it produces for its community would likely be injeop-
ardy, because a criminal reputation can adversely affect business to de-
prive the community of that benefit.'0 8 This, as a matter of public
policy, could decrease shareholder incentive to discipline managers,
because shareholders would fear that such discipline could prompt a
corporate conviction, that would cause stigmatization and decrease the
101. Id. at 41-2; Davis J. Reilly, Murder Inc.: The Criminal Liability of Corporations for
Homicide, 18 S.H. L. REv. 378, 401 (1988) (citing Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.:
Constitutional, Utilitarian, and Moral Perspectives, 27 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 857, 879-80
(1983)).
102. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 2.
103. Corporate Homicide Act 2000, §3(5) (Eng.). Section 3, in relevant part, reads
as follows:
(5) A corporation which fails to comply with an order under this section is guilty of an
offense and liable-
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine ...
104. John C. Coffee Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick:" An Unscandalized Look
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 408 (1981).
105. Id.
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value of the entire corporation due to the misconduct of one or a few
individuals.109
Additionally, by spreading the punishment across a wide body, the
Corporate Homicide Bill does not advance society toward its goal to
decrease homicide, because doing so diminishes the punishment's de-
terrent effect. Deterrence only works when individual punishment is
involved; specific deterrence is premised on an individual's incarcera-
tion and his or her reflection upon it, and general deterrence is pre-
mised on potential criminals reflecting on a convict's incarceration. 01
Thus, the House of Commons should reform the Corporate Homicide
Bill to more adequately deter corporate-related homicide and prevent
the harmful consequences which would follow if it were enacted as it is
written.
IV. INDIVIDUAL PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATE FUNCTIONARIES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMICIDE
A more effective way to deter corporate-related homicide without
incurring the adverse externalities that accompany corporate fining is
to imprison corporate functionaries associated with the homicide. I II
Individual punishment satisfies the aspirations of criminal justice more
effectively than corporate fines because it instills a more concrete fear
in employees to work responsibly: 1 2 The fear of going to jail is much
more substantial than the fear of taking a pay cut or losing a job.
Thus, individual punishment is more likely to deter the actions, omis-
sions, or management failures that result in death.
Further, individual punishment, unlike the corporate fine, would
not adversely affect the public in any way. 113 There is much less stigma
placed on the corporation because only those individuals responsible
for the homicide are labeled "criminals."'1 14 The corporation can
continue to supply the benefit it produces for the community unfet-
tered by a criminal reputation or dislike within the community.1 5 Ad-
ditionally, the corporation would not harm innocent people by
withholding dividend payments, making financial cutbacks, or laying
109. Id.
110. See Blecker, supra note 16.
111. Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29, at 17.
112. Reilly, supra note 101, at 404.
113. Id.; see also Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29; Coffee, supra note 104.
114. Coffee, supra note 104.
115. Reilly, supra note 101, at 402-04.
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off employees to satisfy the punishment, as it would do to satisfy a
fine.' 1 6
Corporations and the public would benefit from individual pun-
ishment because the corporations would shed their irresponsible em-
ployees (as they would be incarcerated) and collectively act more
responsibly with respect to public safety.1 17 Thus, the House of Com-
mons should remove §1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill, which aims to
deter corporate-related homicide by punishing the corporate entity
with fines.
The Corporate Homicide Bill contains a well-intentioned provi-
sion designed to punish individuals for corporate-related homicide;" 8
however, it is not without faults. The Corporate Homicide Bill limits
individual liability for homicide to an officer,1 9 which it defines very
narrowly as "the chairman, managing director, chief executive, or sec-
retary of a corporation." 20
The Corporate Homicide Bill, while realistically foreseeing that
most important business decisions are made by high executive of-
ficers, 12 1 does not hold liable for homicide other corporate functiona-
ries who may be closely associated with a death. 122 Plant supervisors
and shop foremen, often without first checking with the CEO or in-
forming a corporate officer, make important decisions regarding the
safety of their workers on a daily basis: The Corporate Homicide Bill
ignores the fact that a plant foreman or supervisor may have more con-
trol over the safety of others than do corporate officers. 12 3 Thus, the
House of Commons should reform the Bill so that it does not limit
liability to officers; it should expand the scope of liability to also in-
clude board members, plant supervisors, foremen, and any other cor-
porate functionaries who, in the scope of their employment, are
associated with the homicide.
Although the Corporate Homicide Bill does not prevent prosecu-
tion for manslaughter or murder in a traditional sense, 124 a court may
116. Coffee, supra note 104, at 408.
117. See generally Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29.
118. Corporate Homicide Act, supra note 6, at §2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at §5.
121. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 2 (referring to the principles embodied by
the American Law Institute on corporate law).
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be more likely to convict for corporate homicide with respect to corpo-
rate related deaths because there is a lesser degree of punishment to
coincide with an arguably lesser degree of culpability. Since the acts
that caused these deaths have generally gone unpunished for the past
decade,125 it is important that the Corporate Homicide Bill becomes a
part of the United Kingdom's criminal laws.
From a public policy perspective, however, the Corporate Homi-
cide Bill's enactment may cause a further decrease in the number of
charges brought against individuals for traditional murder or man-
slaughter. The Director of Public Prosecutions may rely on the man-
agement failure theory to punish the corporate entity instead of
prosecuting individuals for murder and manslaughter. In other words,
individuals responsible for the death may "get away with murder" be-
cause prosecutors would focus more on the corporate crime, thereby
abandoning any attempt to prosecute the individual.
V. CONCLUSION
While society may desire to avenge the deaths of many people and
deter future deaths, it must not do so in a manner that continues to
harm it further. A corporate fine has this effect, but individual punish-
ment does not.1 26 Additionally, a collective corporate fine does not
adequately serve the aspirations of deterrence as ajustification for pun-
ishment; deterrence is only effective when people are punished
individually.
Further, the House of Commons should reform the Corporate
Homicide Bill to apply to individuals only. While all crimes, except
those of strict liability, involve an act and a culpable mental state,1 27
"[a] corporation is an abstraction. It is incapable itself of doing any
physical act or being in any state of mind."1 28
Vincent Todarello
125. See generally Eaglesham, supra note 5.
126. Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29, at 17.
127. See generally Dresser, supra note 10.
128. P & 0 European Ferries, 93 Cr. App. R. 72.
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